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Abstract 
How does a representative's position in the group influence behaviour in intergroup 
negotiation? Applying insights from the social identity approach (specifically self-
categorization theory), the effects of group member prototypicality, accountability, and group 
attractiveness on competitiveness in intergroup bargaining were examined. As 
representatives of their group, participants engaged in a computer-mediated negotiation with 
a simulated outgroup opponent. In Exp. 1 (N = 114), representatives with a peripheral status 
in the group sent more competitive and fewer cooperative messages to the opponent than did 
prototypical representatives, but only under accountability. Exp. 2 (N = 110) replicated this 
finding, and showed that, under accountability, peripherals also made higher demands than 
did prototypicals, but only when group membership was perceived as attractive. Results are 
discussed in relation to impression management and strategic behaviour. 
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Group Member Prototypicality and Intergroup Negotiation: 
How One's Standing in the Group Affects Negotiation Behaviour 
Social interactions can produce conflict at all levels of society. One of the most 
common and constructive ways of resolving such conflicts is through negotiation, which can 
be defined as a discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving a perceived 
divergence of interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Many negotiations are conducted by 
representatives, that is, negotiators who represent the interests of a group. Although such 
negotiations have a tremendous impact on society, the factors that influence the behaviour of 
representatives in intergroup negotiations are poorly understood. What factors determine the 
competitiveness of their demands and communications? When do negotiators yield and when 
do they stand firm? To answer these questions, the present research applies principles from 
the social identity approach (e.g., Hogg, 2003; Hogg & Abrams, 1988), specifically from 
self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), 
to intergroup negotiation, starting from the assumption that the representative's standing 
within the group plays a crucial role in determining his or her negotiation behaviour. 
Although influential negotiation theorists have traditionally made no distinction 
between interpersonal and intergroup negotiation, these types of negotiation differ in 
important respects (Couch, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Putnam & Poole, 1987). An 
obvious yet important characteristic of intergroup negotiation is that it is typically not 
feasible for all those concerned to be present at the bargaining table. Therefore, intergroup 
negotiations are usually conducted by representatives (Adams, 1976; Rubin & Sander, 1988; 
Walton & McKersie, 1965). This notion introduces an additional set of features that do not 
apply in interpersonal negotiation. For example, negotiators who negotiate on behalf of a 
group tend to be strongly motivated to make a positive impression and avoid making a 
negative impression on their constituents (Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; 
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Wall, 1975, 1991), which is often reflected in a reduced willingness to make concessions 
(Benton, 1972; Druckman, Solomon, & Zechmeister, 1972). 
In a related vein, research indicates that people take a more competitive stance in 
intergroup than in interpersonal negotiations (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 
1990; Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; Kramer, 1991b; Lindskold, McElwain, & Wayner, 1977; 
Schopler, Insko, Graetz, Drigotas, & Smith, 1991; Stephenson, 1981). Similarly, negotiators 
judge coercion to be more effective than conciliation when dealing with an outgroup rather 
than an ingroup (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 1991a; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988), and 
they tend to believe that their constituents favour a tough approach as well (Benton & 
Druckman, 1974; Druckman, 1994). Therefore, negotiators' tendency to take a competitive 
stance in intergroup negotiation is increased when they are accountable to their groups (Ben-
Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 
1981; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Gruder, 1971; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974). 
This research has increased understanding of how representatives' behaviour is 
influenced by the fact that they are part of a larger collective that may hold them accountable 
for the negotiation process and outcome. However, it is relatively silent with respect to the 
question of how the representative's relation to those constituents, that is, his or her position 
within the group, affects his or her behaviour. And yet a negotiator's position within the 
group may play a critical role. Research has found that accountable representatives take 
longer to reach an agreement, but only when they are attracted to their group (Breaugh & 
Klimoski, 1977; Klimoski, 1972). Other research suggests that representatives who enjoy 
high status within their group may be less tied to their constituents' views and have more 
leeway to make concessions than those with low status (Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Kogan, 
Lamm, & Trommsdorff, 1972). Finally, negotiators who feel distrusted by their constituents 
tend to make tougher demands and reach fewer agreements than those who feel trusted (Frey 
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& Adams, 1972; Haccoun & Klimoski, 1975; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Wall, 1975). 
Prototypicality and Intergroup Negotiation 
Previous research suggests that negotiators behave more competitively in intergroup 
negotiations because they wish to make a favorable impression on their constituents. 
However, this research has ignored the question of why negotiators are motivated to make a 
favorable impression. Adopting a social identity perspective on intergroup negotiation, we 
propose that negotiators may be strategically motivated to make a favorable impression on 
their group members because they believe that this will lead to greater acceptance by the 
other group members. People derive an important aspect of their self-concept from their 
membership of certain groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), and 
they have a strong desire to feel included in, and accepted by, those groups (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). The extent to which people will be concerned about being accepted by their 
group members is likely to depend, among other things, on their position within the group--
those who are at the periphery of the group have more reason to be concerned about being 
accepted as a group member than those who are at the core of the group (e.g., Noel, Wann, & 
Branscombe, 1995; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & van Dijk, 2000). 
This distinction between peripheral and core group members is closely reflected in 
the concept of group member prototypicality, which is central to self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987; also see Hogg, 2003). Group members vary in the extent 
to which they are prototypical of the group, that is, representative of what the members of the 
group have in common and what differentiates the group from other groups. Some group 
members possess characteristics that are more prototypical of the group, and therefore can be 
considered better examples of the group than others (Hogg, 1993, 2005; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, 
& Holzworth, 1993; Noel et al., 1995; Turner et al., 1987). Group members who strongly 
match group prototypes can be referred to as prototypical group members. Individuals who 
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are less prototypical examples of their group can be referred to as peripheral group members 
(e.g., Hogg, 2005; Noel et al., 1995). 
A considerable body of research has documented that prototypical group members 
enjoy more standing within the group than peripheral group members (Fielding & Hogg, 
1997; Hogg, 2001; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Hogg & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; van Knippenberg et al., 2000; van 
Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994). Group members who find themselves in a peripheral 
position in the group may thus be motivated to assert their group belongingness, 
demonstrating that, despite their apparent position, they are true (i.e., prototypical) members 
of the group (Noel et al., 1995; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001; see also Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002). One way in which peripheral group members may improve their position 
within the group is by presenting themselves as holding especially favourable attitudes 
toward the ingroup or unfavourable attitudes toward the outgroup (Ellemers et al., 2002; 
Jones & Pittman, 1982) or by stressing characteristics that they share with the ingroup 
prototype (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). However, such strategies are only useful when the 
focal group member's attitudes toward the ingroup and/or the outgroup become known to the 
other group members. Consistent with this idea, Noel et al. (1995) found that peripheral 
group members expressed more negative judgments and advocated more coercive behaviour 
against the outgroup than did prototypical members, but only under public (not private) 
conditions. In contrast, prototypical group members' judgments were not influenced by 
public-private differences. 
Prototypicality and Strategic Behaviour 
The above discussion suggests that peripheral group members may be more strategic 
and sensitive to social context than prototypical group members. Indeed, a growing body of 
research indicates that peripheral group members' behaviour is fueled by strategic 
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considerations. For example, in the aforementioned study by Noel et al. (1995), peripherals 
displayed high levels of ingroup favouring and outgroup derogating behaviour only when this 
behaviour was strategically advantageous to them in terms of providing an opportunity to 
prove their loyalty to the group (i.e., under public conditions). Also suggestive of strategic 
motives, Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, and McKimmie (2003) found that peripheral group 
members who identified weakly with the group were less loyal when they anticipated future 
rejection by the group than when they anticipated future acceptance, suggesting that 
peripherals are only motivated to behave in ways that are favourable to the group when doing 
so is likely to result in some kind of strategic advantage (e.g., increased acceptance by the 
group). Compatible findings were reported by Barreto and Ellemers (2000), who observed 
that high identifiers displayed pro-group behaviour regardless of whether they were 
accountable to their group members, whereas low identifiers displayed pro-group behaviour 
when they were accountable and individualistic behaviour when they were anonymous. 
Jetten, Hornsey, and Adarves-Yorno (in press) extended these findings to the domain 
of conformity, examining how individuals strategically tailor self-reports of conformity as a 
function of their status within the group. Operationalising prototypicality in terms of 
seniority, they found support for strategic impression management on the part of junior (i.e., 
peripheral) group members. Across different samples they found that people who felt more 
junior were more willing than those who felt senior to admit conformity when they were 
addressing an ingroup as opposed to an outgroup audience and when they believed their 
responses would be made public rather than remain private. Finally, in a recent series of 
studies Jetten, Hornsey, Spears, Haslam, and Cowell (2005) found that peripheral group 
members were more likely to express loyalty when they felt monitored, when identity threat 
was low, when the audience was high status, and when there was little risk of alienating other 
ingroup members. On the basis of these findings Jetten et al. concluded that peripheral group 
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members are more sensitive to social context than are prototypical group members. 
Furthermore, they concluded that peripherals are more likely than prototypicals to make a 
strategic cost-benefit analysis to inform their behaviour. When the benefits of keeping up the 
appearance of being a good group member exceed the costs, they argue, peripherals will 
display pro-group behaviour. When the costs outweigh the benefits, however, pro-group 
behaviour is much less likely. 
In sum, then, a growing body of research points to the strategic nature of peripherals' 
group-related behaviour. It appears that peripherals are more likely to engage in group-
serving behaviour to the extent that such behaviour can be expected to have positive 
consequences for them in the future (e.g., greater acceptance by other group members). What 
kind of behaviour they will display to prove their groupy credentials is likely to depend on 
the (presumed) group norm. In many instances peripheral group members can be expected to 
try to prove their loyalty to the group by favouring the ingroup and/or derogating the 
outgroup (Noel et al., 1995). Peripheral group representatives involved in intergroup 
negotiation can be expected to follow an analogous strategy. Given that representatives in 
intergroup negotiation typically assume that their constituents favour a tough and competitive 
approach (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Druckman, 1994), peripheral group representatives 
can be predicted to take a competitive stance vis-à-vis the outgroup to the extent that they 
believe this will be strategically advantageous to them in terms of proving their loyalty to the 
group. 
The Present Research 
Despite the pervasiveness of representative negotiation as a conflict management 
strategy and means of conducting social and economic exchange, very little is know about 
the factors that determine the behaviour of representatives in intergroup negotiation. We 
argue that one of the factors that may be of paramount importance in this respect is the 
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representative's position in the group (i.e., his or her prototypicality). A prototypical ingroup 
status may be derived from a number of factors, such as (expectations regarding) acceptance 
by the other group members (e.g., Jetten et al., 2003), how long one has been a member of 
the group (c.f. Moreland, 1985; Moreland & Levine, 1989), or how well one exemplifies the 
group (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Noel et 
al., 1995). In the present research we focus on the latter type of prototypicality, which rests 
on the idea that some group members are "better" examples of the ingroup than others 
because they more closely match the group prototype (Hogg, 2005; Turner, 1985; Turner et 
al., 1987). In the following we report two experiments that investigated the role of 
representative prototypicality in intergroup negotiation. 
The research reviewed above suggests that representatives with a peripheral status 
within the group should be especially likely to engage in strategic behaviours aimed at 
increasing acceptance by the other group members. By contrast, prototypical representatives 
should be less motivated to engage in such strategic behaviours, because their position within 
the group is already secure. This difference between prototypical and peripheral 
representatives should only obtain in situations where the representative's behaviour can be 
monitored by the other group members. If the representative's behaviour remains unknown to 
the other group members, strategic self-presentation is no longer possible, and hence no 
effects should be anticipated. 
Based on this line of reasoning, we predicted that peripheral group representatives 
would display tougher negotiation behaviour vis-à-vis the outgroup than would prototypical 
representatives, but only under process accountability, that is, if their behaviour can be 
monitored by their group. This prediction was tested in two experiments, using a computer-
mediated negotiation task. Prior to the negotiation, participants received bogus feedback on a 
personality test that supposedly divided the participants into two groups, and made them 
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either prototypical or peripheral members of their group (see Noel et al., 1995). Participants 
were then selected to represent their group in negotiation with a representative of the other 
group, whose behaviour was in reality simulated by the computer (see De Dreu & Van Kleef, 
2004; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b).  
As in prior research, we focused on the two classes of dependent variables that 
together capture the bulk of negotiation behaviours, namely verbal communications and 
demands (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Examples of verbal communications include threats, 
positional commitments, verbalised intentions, and meta-communications regarding the 
mutually optimal negotiation strategy. On the other hand, there is a class of behaviours 
related to the actual division of resources, which includes placing demands, making offers, 
and making concessions. We cover both classes of behaviours by focusing on cooperative 
and competitive communications on the one hand, and actual demands on the other. 
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the interactive effects of group member 
prototypicality and process accountability on the representative's behaviour in intergroup 
negotiation. Based on the research discussed above, it can be predicted that peripheral group 
members will show tougher negotiation behaviour than prototypical group members, but only 
when they are accountable to their constituents. Thus, we hypothesised that, under conditions 
of accountability, peripheral group representatives would send fewer cooperative messages 
(Hypothesis 1a), send more competitive messages (Hypothesis 1b), and report more 
competitive intentions (Hypothesis 1c) than prototypical representatives. We further 
hypothesised that peripheral group members would place higher demands than would 
prototypical group representatives, but again only under conditions of accountability 
(Hypothesis 2). No differences were anticipated in the non-accountable conditions. 
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Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
 A total of 114 undergraduate students (45 males and 69 females, average age M = 
18.86 years, SD = 1.73) at the University of Queensland were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (prototypical vs. peripheral) x 2 (accountable vs. non-accountable) between-
participants design. 
Procedure 
For each session, between six and eight participants were welcomed to the laboratory. 
They were told that the experiment had two parts, and that they would be working in groups 
for both parts. During the first part they would be using the computer network to complete 
tasks and communicate with their fellow group members, and for the second they would join 
their group members to work together face-to-face. 
As a cover story, we told participants that the purpose of the experiment was to 
investigate the effect of personality on group decision making, and that they would be 
divided into two groups on the basis of a relevant personality dimension. To substantiate this 
story,  participants completed a "personality questionnaire" containing items such as "I feel 
uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me" and "When trying to 
solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing." 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were asked to imagine that they 
worked for an advertising agency that had to create an advertising campaign (i.e., 
promotional posters) for three new cars, called Amaro, Bailo, and Cogo. They were 
instructed that each group would create three posters, which would be awarded a certain 
number of points, and that the groups would be competing against each other for a reward. 
Participants learned that randomly selected representatives of the two groups would negotiate 
the reward system for the posters, determining how many points each group would get for 
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each poster. It was stressed that it was important to obtain as many points as possible, and 
that the members of the group that obtained most points would win a voucher for a free 
lunch. 
Manipulation of prototypicality. We used a manipulation of prototypicality that has 
been successfully employed in prior research (De Cremer, 2002; Noel et al., 1995), providing 
participants with bogus feedback on the "personality questionnaire." Participants were told 
that the questionnaire assessed the so-called "O-type/P-type personality." They read that O-
type and P-type persons differ in a number of respects, one of which being that they tend to 
think in different ways and come up with different solutions to problems. They learned that 
their responses on the personality questionnaire would not only reveal whether they were an 
O-type or a P-type person, but also how characteristic they were of the O-group or the P-
group. They read that the computer would characterise each participant as either a typical, a 
moderate, or a peripheral group member, indicating how well they fit into their group. 
Participants were then shown a graphical representation of the "O/P continuum" (see Figure 
1). In the prototypical group member conditions, their participant number was plotted in the 
"typical P-type" box of Figure 1. In the peripheral group member conditions, it was plotted in 
the "peripheral P-type" box. Three other participant numbers were also plotted on the graph, 
so that in each condition participants were part of a group that had three prototypical 
members, and one peripheral member. Thus, when the participant was classified as 
peripheral, the three other group members were all classified as prototypical. When the 
participant was classified as prototypical, two other group members were classified as 
prototypical and one as peripheral.1 
Participants in the prototypical group member conditions then received the following 
information (adapted from Noel et al., 1995): "Your test score is 63. As you can see, this 
score places you at the core of the type-P category. You are a typical P-type. This means that 
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had you responded somewhat differently to one or two of the questionnaire items, you would 
still have been classified as a type-P person. Not only do you have more in common with 
other type-P persons than with type-O persons, you are actually a near perfect example of a 
type-P person." They further read: "Because you are a typical P-person, it is nicer for you to 
be in the P-group than in the O-group." Participants in the peripheral group member 
conditions read: "Your test score is 43. As you can see, this score places you just inside the 
type-P category. You are a peripheral P-type. This means that had you responded somewhat 
differently to one or two of the questionnaire items, you would not have been classified as a 
type-P person. Although you have more in common with other type-P persons than with 
type-O persons, you are not very characteristic of the type-P group." They further read: 
"Although you are a peripheral P-person, it is still nicer for you to be in the P-group than in 
the O-group." This latter sentence was added to make sure that peripheral participants, too, 
would still feel they belonged more to the P-group (ingroup) than to the O-group (outgroup). 
 Manipulation of accountability. Participants were instructed that one representative of 
each group would negotiate, and that he or she would join the group after the negotiation. In 
the accountability conditions we added that while the representatives were negotiating, the 
other group members would observe the negotiation via their computer screens, and that the 
representative would have the opportunity to explain his or her behaviour to the other group 
members afterwards. In the non-accountability conditions we added that during the 
negotiation the other group members would fill out a number of questionnaires. The 
manipulations were followed by a brief simulated chat session to familiarise participants with 
the computer-mediated interaction and to enhance their sense of groupiness. During the chat 
session, participants were allowed to send a brief message to their group members, and they 
received some messages from the other group members referring to the upcoming negotiation 
and to the lunch prize. 
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 Selection of the representatives. After the manipulations, the computer ostensibly 
selected the representatives of the two groups at random. All participants learned that they 
had been selected as the representative of the P-group. Subsequently, participants were 
introduced to the negotiation task detailed below. 
Negotiation task. The negotiation task was adapted from one used by Van Kleef et al. 
(2004a, b; see also De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & 
Carnevale, 1993), which captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation (i.e., 
multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one's own payoffs 
only, and the typical offer-counteroffer sequence). Participants were presented with a payoff 
chart (see Table 1) that showed them which outcomes were most favourable to their group, 
and they were told that their objective was to earn as many points as possible for their group. 
As can be seen in Table 1, level 9 on the Amaro campaign yielded 0 points and level 1 
yielded 400 points (i.e., increments of 50 points per level). For the Bailo campaign, level 9 
yielded 0 points, and level 1 yielded 120 points (i.e., increments of 15 points per level). 
Finally, for the Cogo campaign, level 9 yielded 0 points, and level 1 yielded 240 points (i.e., 
increments of 30 points per level). Participants read, "You can see that the best deal for your 
group is 1-1-1, for a total outcome of 760 points (400 + 120 + 240)." The corresponding 
payoff table for the O-group was not displayed, and participants were told only that it 
differed from their own. 
Participants were then invited to make a first offer, and were instructed that the 
negotiation would continue until an agreement was reached or until time ran out. Over the 
negotiation rounds the buyer proposed the following levels of agreement (for Amaro - Bailo - 
Cogo): 8-7-8 (round 1), 8-7-7 (round 2), 8-6-7 (round 3), 7-6-7 (round 4), 7-6-6 (round 5), 
and 6-6-6 (round 6). Past research has shown that this preprogrammed strategy has face 
validity and is considered intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & 
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Van Lange, 1995). A demand by the participant was accepted if it equaled or exceeded the 
offer the computer was about to make in the next round. If no agreement was reached after 
the sixth round, the negotiation was interrupted because up to this point few participants 
suspect that they are playing against a computer, whereas after the sixth round such suspicion 
tends to develop (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). 
In each negotiation round participants were presented with a list of seven cooperative 
and seven competitive messages, and were given the opportunity to select a message from 
this list to send to the representative of the O-group. Participants could also choose not to 
send a message. They received no message from the opponent. The messages were adapted 
from Hilty and Carnevale (1993) and De Dreu (1995), who have shown that messages 
intended to be cooperative are indeed viewed as cooperative, and that messages intended to 
be competitive are rated as competitive. Examples of cooperative messages are "Let's try to 
consider both of our needs and interests" or "I hope that this offer is good for you." Examples 
of competitive messages are "Improve your offer if you want an agreement" or "This is as far 
as I will go, take it or leave it." 
Dependent measures. Participants' demands in each of the six rounds were 
transformed into an index revealing the negotiator's total level of demand for that round (i.e., 
the sum of the number of points asked for each campaign; see Table 1). Levels of demand in 
the six rounds were in turn combined into an index of the negotiator's average demands (see 
De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van De Vliert, 1994). Furthermore, the participants' 
cooperative and competitive messages were recorded, as well as the self-rated 
competitiveness of these messages ("How did you intend this message?"; 1 = very 
cooperative, 9 = very competitive). After the negotiation, participants were asked "How 
central to the P-group do you feel you are?" (manipulation check of prototypicality; 1 = not 
very central, 9 = very central), and "Were your group members watching you during the 
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negotiation?" (manipulation check of accountability; 1 = definitely not, 9 = definitely).  
Results 
Treatment of the Data 
 Data were analyzed by analysis of variance, using the complete 2 (prototypical vs. 
peripheral) x 2 (accountable vs. non-accountable) design. One participant reached agreement 
in round 5, and had to be excluded from further analyses due to missing values in round 6. 
Because the number of rounds was limited, the numbers of competitive messages and 
cooperative messages sent were in principal dependent (i.e., sending more of the one type 
leaves less opportunity to send messages of the other type), and results for these two 
measures should not be regarded as independent observations. For illustrative purposes, 
however, and because the correlation between the number of cooperative and competitive 
messages suggested less than complete dependence (r = -.42, p < .001), we report results for 
both cooperative and competitive messages in a repeated-measures design. 
Manipulation Checks 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of prototypicality on the prototypicality 
check, F(1, 109) = 18.71, p < .001, η2 = .14. Prototypical members indeed felt more 
prototypical of their group than did peripheral members (M = 6.33, SD = 1.77 vs. M = 4.87, 
SD = 1.85). There was no significant effect of accountability, and no interaction (both Fs < 1, 
ns). ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of accountability on the accountability 
check, F(1, 109) = 21.17, p < .001, η2 = .16--accountable negotiators felt more observed by 
their fellow group members than did non-accountable negotiators (M = 6.02, SD = 2.36 vs. M 
= 4.24, SD = 1.74). There were no other significant effects (Fs < 1, ns). Thus, it can be 
concluded that the manipulations of prototypicality and accountability were successful. 
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Messages 
 The numbers of cooperative and competitive messages were submitted to a 2 
(prototypical vs. peripheral) x 2 (accountable vs. non-accountable) x 2 (cooperative vs. 
competitive message) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor. This analysis 
yielded a significant three-way interaction between prototypicality, accountability and 
message type, indicating that the relative amount of cooperative and competitive messages 
sent was influenced by prototypicality and accountability, F(1, 109) = 9.30, p = .003, η2 = 
.08. Below we report follow-up analyses that were conducted to examine the specific patterns 
of cooperative and competitive messages across experimental conditions. 
Number of cooperative messages. ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between 
prototypicality and accountability on the number of cooperative messages sent, F(1, 109) = 
6.33, p = .013, η2 = .06 (means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2). Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1a, simple-effects analysis revealed that, under accountability, peripheral 
group members sent significantly fewer cooperative messages than did prototypical group 
members, F(1, 109) = 5.65, p = .017, η2 = .10. In the non-accountability conditions, no 
significant difference was found, F(1, 109) = 1.43, p = .23. 
Number of competitive messages. A compatible pattern of results was obtained for the 
number of competitive messages sent. Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, we found a significant 
interaction between prototypicality and accountability, F(1, 109) = 6.54, p = .013, η2 = .06 
(see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). In line with the results pertaining to 
cooperative messages, simple-effects analysis showed that, when held accountable, 
peripheral group members sent more competitive messages to the opponent than did 
prototypical group members, F(1, 109) = 9.69, p = .004, η2 = .14. Again, no difference was 
found in the non-accountability conditions, F(1, 109) < 1, ns. 
 Self-reported competitiveness. Results pertaining to self-reported competitiveness 
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were fully consistent with the results described above. In line with Hypothesis 1c, ANOVA 
yielded a significant interaction between prototypicality and accountability, F(1, 109) = 7.57, 
p = .007, η2 = .07 (see Table 2). Under accountability, peripheral representatives reported 
more competitive intentions than did prototypical representatives, F(1, 109) = 7.71, p = .006, 
η2 = .13, whereas no significant difference was found in the non-accountability conditions, 
F(1, 109) = 1.26, p = .26. 
Demands 
Contrary to our predictions, we found no significant effects of prototypicality and 
accountability on participants' demands (524 < Ms < 557; 80 < SDs < 89; main effect 
accountability: F < 1, ns; main effect prototypicality: F = 2.24, p = .14; accountability x 
prototypicality: F < 1, ns). Thus, no support was found for Hypothesis 2. 
Discussion 
It was predicted that a representative's prototypicality would influence his or her 
behaviour in an intergroup negotiation. More specifically, we argued that representatives 
occupying a peripheral position within the ingroup should be especially likely to display 
strategic behaviours aimed at proving their loyalty to the group (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & 
Coleman, 1993; Jetten et al., 2003, in press; Noel et al., 1995). Consistent with these 
predictions, and reflecting the typical belief among representatives that their constituents 
favour a tough negotiation approach (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Druckman, 1994), we 
found that peripheral representatives sent fewer cooperative messages, sent more competitive 
messages, and reported more competitive intentions than did prototypical representatives, but 
only under process accountability. However, such competitiveness was not observed at the 
level of participants' demands. 
These findings may be taken to suggest that sending competitive messages and 
making competitive demands require different levels of motivation to be accepted by the 
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group. Sending competitive messages is a relatively safe yet efficient way of conveying a 
tough impression to one's constituents without risking the negative consequences (e.g., an 
unprofitable impasse) of making overly intransigent demands (Wall, 1991). It could be, 
therefore, that in order for peripheral representatives to take the risk of actually engaging in 
competitive behaviour (i.e., making tough demands), as opposed to merely communicating 
competitive intentions, they must be more strongly motivated to gain the acceptance of the 
group (i.e., the threshold for making competitive demands may be higher). This reasoning is 
in line with Jetten et al.'s (2005) argument that peripheral group members are more sensitive 
to what the social context affords in determining the utility and costs of expressing group 
loyalty than are prototypical group members. 
The proposition that peripheral group members are motivated to display self-
presentational outgroup derogation to enhance their position within their group rests on the 
assumption that membership in the group is desirable (Noel et al., 1995; cf. Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2001). Accordingly, peripheral members should engage in behaviours that 
serve to assert their group belongingness to the extent that group membership is attractive to 
them. Translating this notion to the present research, we predict that the attractiveness of the 
group will, at least in part, determine to what extent accountable representatives with a 
peripheral position are motivated to gain the acceptance and approval of their constituents. 
As a result, the more attractive the group membership, the more peripheral representatives 
can be expected to try to gain the acceptance of their group, which should be manifested in 
higher demands. This prediction was tested in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
The objective of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the findings 
obtained in Experiment 1 for accountable negotiators. Because no effects should be 
anticipated in the non-accountability conditions, all participants were presented with the high 
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accountability instructions. Given that all participants were made accountable, we predicted 
that peripheral group members would send fewer cooperative messages, send more 
competitive messages, and report more competitive intentions than prototypical 
representatives (cf. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, Experiment 1). Second, we wanted to test the 
group attractiveness explanation for the absence of an effect on demands in Experiment 1. To 
test this explanation, we manipulated group attractiveness, and predicted that peripheral 
representatives would make tougher demands than prototypical representatives when the 
group was attractive, but not when the group was unattractive (Hypothesis 3). Note that we 
thus predict a main effect of prototypicality on number of cooperative and competitive 
messages and intentions, and an interaction between prototypicality and group attractiveness 
on demands. Given that in the accountability condition of Experiment 1 the number of 
cooperative and competitive messages was already significantly influenced by prototypicality 
(i.e., in the absence of information that made the group attractive), we did not expect this 
effect to be moderated by group attractiveness. However, because we did not find an effect of 
prototypicality on demands in the accountability conditions in Experiment 1, we expected 
that the effect of prototypicality on demands would be moderated by group attractiveness, 
such that we should find an effect of prototypicality in the high-attractiveness condition but 
not in the low-attractiveness condition. 
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
A total of 110 undergraduate students (34 males and 76 females, average age M = 
19.21 years, SD = 3.10) at the University of Queensland were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (prototypical vs. peripheral) x 2 (high vs. low group attractiveness) design.  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with two significant exceptions: (1) 
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all participants were made accountable to their group members, and (2) group attractiveness 
was manipulated. Below we describe those aspects of the procedure that differed from the 
procedure used in Experiment 1. 
Manipulation of group attractiveness. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants 
completed a computerised "scrambled words test." The test consisted of sixty anagrams, each 
between 5 and 11 characters in length. Participants were instructed to solve as many 
anagrams as possible in a 4 minute period. In order to facilitate the provision of false 
feedback (see below), we included 10 unsolvable anagrams. After the presentation of the 
prototypicality manipulation (same as in Experiment 1) and the accountability instructions 
(all participants were told that their group members would monitor their negotiation 
behaviour), we provided bogus feedback on the anagram test, in the form of a Group 
Creativity Score. This score was described as "a weighted compound of the scores of you and 
your fellow group members, which reflects the group's creativity and is unrelated to the O/P-
personality score." 
This Group Creativity Score was used to manipulate group attractiveness. All 
participants were told that their Group Creativity Score was 92.5. Subsequently, participants 
in the low group attractiveness conditions learned that "the average creativity score of 
University of Queensland students is 138.4. Thus, your group scores below average on 
creativity, cognitive flexibility, and related cognitive skills." Participants in the high 
attractiveness conditions were told that "the average creativity score of University of 
Queensland students is 46.6. Thus, your group scores above average on creativity, cognitive 
flexibility, and related cognitive skills." 
 In order to be able to exclude the possibility that effects of the group attractiveness 
manipulation would be caused by unintended effects on mood or self-esteem, participants 
were asked to rate their current mood state on six 5-point scales (e.g., relaxed - nervous, self-
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assured - uncertain, happy - sad). Because of substantial intercorrelations, these items were 
combined in one index of participant's mood (α = .81). State self-esteem was measured with 
five items (e.g., "I feel inferior to others at this moment"; "I feel displeased with myself"), 
which were averaged into a self-esteem index (α = .92). Results revealed no effects of the 
manipulations on either of these scales, both Fs < 1, ns. 
Dependent measures. As in Experiment 1, the key dependent variables were the 
number of cooperative and competitive messages sent, self-rated competitiveness, and 
average demands, which were measured in the same way as in Experiment 1. The 
manipulation of group attractiveness was checked with five items: "How attractive do you 
find the P-group?" (1 = not very attractive, 9 = very attractive); "How proud are you to be a 
member of the P-group?" (1 = not very proud, 9 = very proud); "How glad are you to be a 
member of the P-group?" (1 = not so glad, 9 = very glad); "How much do you like the P-
group" (1 = not very much, 9 = very much"); and "What is your general impression of the P-
group?" (1 = very negative, 9 = very positive). These items were combined into an index of 
group attractiveness (α = .86). Compared to Experiment 1, we used four additional items to 
check the successfulness of the prototypicality manipulation. The resulting prototypicality 
scale thus consisted of five items (α = .84): "How central to the P-group do you feel you 
are?"; "How much do you feel you belong to the P-group?"; "How well do you feel you fit in 
the P-group?"; "Do you feel you are a good example of a P-group member?"; and "How 
similar do you feel to your fellow group members?"; "1 = not at all, 9 = a great deal). The 
accountability instructions were checked in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Treatment of the Data 
 Data were analyzed by ANOVA over the full 2 (prototypical vs. peripheral) x 2 
(attractive group vs. unattractive group) design. (Recall that all participants were given the 
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accountability instructions.) Five participants reached agreement before the sixth negotiation 
round, and were excluded from further analyses due to missing values. As in Experiment 1, 
the numbers of competitive and cooperative messages were not independent (r = -.44, p < 
.001), but results for both measures are reported for illustrative purposes. 
Manipulation Checks 
 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of prototypicality on the prototypicality 
index, F(1, 101) = 45.80, p < .001, η2 = .31--participants in the prototypical conditions felt 
more prototypical of their group than did those in the peripheral conditions (M = 5.70, SD = 
1.23 vs. M = 3.89, SD = 1.47). There were no other significant effects (Fs < 1, ns). Further, 
participants in the high group attractiveness conditions judged the P-group as more attractive 
than did participants in the low attractiveness conditions (M = 6.94, SD = 0.87 vs. M = 4.80, 
SD = 1.12), F(1, 101) = 119.35, p < .001, η2 = .54 (there were no other effects, Fs < 1, ns). 
The accountability check was used to find out whether participants indeed felt accountable to 
their group members. A one-sample t test revealed that the average response on the 
accountability check was significantly higher than the scale mean (M = 7.69, SD = 1.44), 
t(104) = 19.16, p < .001, indicating that the accountability instructions had been successful. 
Accountability ratings were not influenced by the other manipulations (Fs < 1, ns). 
Messages 
 The numbers of cooperative and competitive messages were submitted to a 2 
(prototypical vs. peripheral) x 2 (attractive vs. unattractive) x 2 (cooperative vs. competitive 
message) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor. This analysis yielded an 
interaction between prototypicality and message type, indicating that the relative amount of 
cooperative and competitive messages participants sent was influenced by prototypicality, 
F(1, 101) = 7.55, p = .007, η2 = .07. Below we report follow-up analyses to examine the 
specific patterns of cooperative and competitive messages across experimental conditions. 
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 Number of cooperative messages. We found a significant effect of prototypicality on 
the number of cooperative messages sent. As expected, peripheral group representatives sent 
fewer cooperative messages to the opponent than did prototypical representatives (M = 2.77, 
SD = 1.86 vs. M = 3.46, SD = 1.70), F(1, 101) = 3.97, p = .049, η2 = .05. Note that, because 
in Experiment 2 all participants were accountable to their group members, this constitutes a 
replication of the effect obtained in Experiment 1. 
 Number of competitive messages. Also consistent with Experiment 1, we obtained a 
significant main effect of prototypicality on the number of competitive messages sent: 
Peripheral group members sent more competitive messages than did prototypical group 
members (M = 1.94, SD = 1.92 vs. M = 1.10, SD = 1.26), F(1, 101) = 7.08, p = .009, η2 = .07. 
 Self-reported competitiveness. Self-reported competitiveness results were in line with 
the results described above. Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, peripheral 
representatives reported more competitive intentions than did prototypical representatives (M 
= 4.95, SD = 1.36 vs. M = 4.05, SD = 1.31), F(1, 101) = 12.00, p < .001, η2 = .11. 
Demands 
We obtained a significant main effect of group attractiveness on average demands, 
showing that representatives of an attractive group made higher demands than did 
representatives of an unattractive group (M = 545, SD = 82 vs. M = 496, SD = 80), F(1, 101) 
= 9.88, p = .002, η2 = .09. More important, we found a significant interaction between 
prototypicality and group attractiveness, F(1, 101) = 4.39, p = .039, η2 = .05 (see Figure 2). 
In support of Hypothesis 3, simple-effects analysis showed that peripheral representatives of 
an attractive group made higher demands than did prototypical representatives of an 
attractive group, F(1, 101) = 4.01, p = .05, η2 = .07. Peripheral and prototypical 
representatives of an unattractive group did not differ, F(1, 101) < 1, ns. 
Discussion 
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 The results of Experiment 2 support our hypotheses. Consistent with the findings of 
Experiment 1, peripheral representatives sent more competitive and fewer cooperative 
messages to the opponent than did prototypical representatives. (Recall that all participants in 
Experiment 2 were accountable.) Peripheral representatives also made tougher demands than 
did prototypical representatives, but only when the group was presented as attractive. When 
the group was presented as unattractive, prototypicality had no effect on representatives' 
demands. This pattern of results seems to suggest that, as anticipated, it takes a higher level 
of motivation to actually make competitive demands than it does to send competitive 
messages. We will return to this issue in more detail in the General Discussion section. 
General Discussion 
The present research investigated how a representative's behaviour in an intergroup 
negotiation is influenced by his or her standing within the group. Based on prior research 
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Noel et al., 1995; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), it was predicted 
that peripheral group representatives, who occupy a marginal position within their group, 
would display tougher negotiation behaviour than prototypical group representatives, but 
only under conditions of process accountability. The results of Experiment 1 supported this 
prediction, by showing that peripheral representatives were more competitive in the level of 
their communications and self-rated behaviour than were prototypical representatives, but 
only when they believed that their group members were monitoring their behaviour.  
Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings. As in Experiment 1, peripheral 
representatives who were accountable to their group members sent more competitive and 
fewer cooperative messages to their opponent than did prototypical representatives. 
Furthermore, peripheral negotiators under accountability made tougher demands in the 
course of the negotiation than did prototypical negotiators, but only when their group was 
presented as attractive. When the group was presented as unattractive, prototypical and 
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peripheral negotiators did not differ with respect to the toughness of their demands. 
In exploring how a representative's position within the group influences his or her 
behaviour in intergroup negotiation, the present study brings together research on group 
member prototypicality and intergroup negotiation. The synthesis of these different lines of 
enquiry extends our knowledge about intergroup negotiation, the effects of prototypicality, 
and the role of impression management and strategic behaviour in intergroup relations. In the 
remainder of this paper, we consider some of the implications of our findings, discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of our approach, and outline some avenues for future research. 
Implications and Contributions 
The present results have important implications for intergroup negotiation. Our 
findings suggest that representatives who are at the periphery of their group are motivated to 
convince their group members that they are really "one of us." When peripheral negotiators 
are under process accountability, expecting their fellow group members to monitor their 
negotiation behaviour, they behave more competitively toward the outgroup than do 
prototypical negotiators. However, when they are not accountable, expecting their behaviour 
to remain unknown to the other group members, they take a less competitive stance, behaving 
in much the same way as prototypical representatives. 
Interestingly, the current results suggest that communicating competitive intentions 
and making competitive demands require different levels of motivation to be accepted as a 
group member. Under accountability, peripheral negotiators sent more competitive messages 
than did prototypical negotiators. However, they increased their actual demands only when 
group membership was made attractive. It would appear, then, that it takes a higher level of 
motivation to make competitive demands than it does to send competitive messages. As 
alluded to earlier, communicating competitive intentions is a relatively safe way of 
conveying a tough impression to one's constituents (Wall, 1991). By contrast, making high 
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demands is a risky venture, which is likely to cause impasse and leave the group empty-
handed (Pruitt, 1981). A tentative conclusion that follows from these results is that 
individuals are only motivated to take such a risk when group membership is perceived as 
highly desirable. This conclusion is in line with Jetten et al.'s (2005) assertion that peripherals 
are more sensitive to social context and are more likely to make a cost-benefit analysis when 
determining whether or not to engage in group-favouring behaviour. It would appear that 
peripherals are more likely to follow the more risky strategy of making intransigent demands 
to the extent that the potential benefits of such a strategy increase (e.g., when doing so 
increases acceptance by the members of a highly attractive group). However, it should be 
noted that this assumption was not directly tested in the present study. 
The present research provides additional--albeit indirect--evidence concerning the 
reasons why peripheral group members are motivated to make a favourable impression on 
their group members. It seems likely that the behaviour of peripheral members in intergroup 
negotiation is fueled by strategic considerations aimed at increasing acceptance by the other 
group members. Although we have no direct evidence supporting a mediating role of such 
strategic motivation, we believe it is a good candidate for three reasons. First, peripherals 
sent more competitive messages to the outgroup only when their fellow group members 
could monitor their behaviour, which may be interpreted as an indication of strategic 
motives. After all, it is much easier to impress one's group members and enhance one's 
position within the group by displaying tough behaviour when those group members take 
notice of one's behaviour. Second, peripheral group members who were held accountable for 
their negotiation behaviour made more competitive demands only when they perceived group 
membership as attractive. This too suggests that strategic considerations (i.e., a cost-benefit 
analysis) determine whether peripherals will show tough behaviour toward the outgroup. 
Third, recent research by Jetten and colleagues (Jetten et al., 2003, 2005, in press) also 
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suggests that peripherals are more strategic in their decisions regarding whether or not to 
exert themselves on behalf of the group than are prototypicals. Whereas prototypicals in 
general are likely to expend effort on behalf of the group, peripherals appear to be more 
likely to work for the group to the extent that doing so entails strategic advantages (e.g., 
increased acceptance by other group members). 
 These findings shed new light on the role of impression management in intergroup 
negotiation. Rahim and Buntzman (1991) noted that impression management plays an 
important role in conflict situations, and they deplored the fact that very little research had 
addressed the issue. The present research adds to our understanding of the role of impression 
management in conflict situations. It illustrates that under specific circumstances, the 
competitive behaviour of negotiators in intergroup disputes may not be aimed at furthering 
the group's interests, but rather at improving their own position within the group. It further 
appears that prototypical group representatives are quite consistent in their behaviour 
regardless of whether or not they perceive the group as attractive. In contrast, peripheral 
group representatives, whose status within the group is less secure, appear to be much more 
sensitive to situational changes. In the present studies, peripheral representatives adopted a 
competitive strategy in their negotiation with the outgroup representative only when they 
believed that their fellow group members could monitor their behaviour and group 
membership was made attractive. This suggests that peripheral group members' behaviour is 
highly strategic and aimed at making a favourable impression on the ingroup, rather than on 
defending the group's interests per se. This conclusion is in line with research by Barreto and 
Ellemers (2000), who found that high identifiers displayed pro-group behaviour regardless of 
whether they were accountable to their group members, whereas low identifiers displayed 
pro-group behaviour when they were accountable and individualistic behaviour when they 
were anonymous. 
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The present analysis of representative behaviour in intergroup negotiation is inspired 
by the social identity approach, and specifically by the notion of prototypicality as described 
in self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). It is important to note, 
however, that our adoption of this perspective does not deny that other analyses of group 
processes might arrive at similar predictions. For example, in their investigation of the role of 
leadership stability in intergroup conflict, Rabbie and Bekkers (1978) started from the 
commonsensical idea that leaders of nations who feel threatened will be likely to engage in 
intergroup conflict in an attempt to unify the nation behind them and/or divert the public's 
attention from their precarious position. Interestingly, however, although these authors do not 
explicitly base their predictions on a social identity analysis, they do assume that "unstable 
leaders are likely to choose intergroup competition, since they are motivated to prove 
themselves in an attempt to assure their chances for re-election," an argument that is strongly 
compatible with our analysis. We decided to adopt self-categorization theory as our main 
perspective because it provides a comprehensive analysis of intergroup behaviour. However, 
we do not claim that this analysis of intergroup negotiation is the only viable one. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
A key feature of self-categorization theory is that not only which group memberships 
are self-definitionally salient but also the way in which we actually represent the groups, the 
prototypes themselves, are influenced by the social context (e.g., Turner et al., 1987). There 
is some debate among social identity scholars on the degree of malleability of group 
prototypes. Some argue that group prototypes are relatively dramatically responsive to 
immediate features of transitory situations (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998). Others 
argue that group prototypes anchor and lend stability to our representations of the social 
world and so although they are responsive to context they also have a degree of inertia (e.g., 
Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Hogg, 2003). This analysis is consistent with uncertainty reduction 
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theory that focuses on the self-conceptual uncertainty reduction function of group prototypes 
(e.g., Hogg, 2000), and with research showing how difficult it is to change group stereotypes 
(e.g., Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Tajfel, 1981). Since 
the aim of the present study was not to demonstrate fluctuations in individuals' 
prototypicality as a function of the situation but rather to explore the effects of prototypicality 
in intergroup negotiation we decided to model our operationalisation of prototypicality on a 
more fixed representation of prototypes. 
We found that peripheral group representatives (as compared to prototypical ones) 
behaved more competitively toward the outgroup, but only when they were accountable to 
their group members and group membership was made attractive. On the basis of these 
findings and previous work by Jetten et al. (2003, 2005, in press) we tentatively concluded 
that peripheral group members' behaviour is fueled by strategic considerations aimed at 
increasing acceptance by their fellow group members. When group membership is made 
attractive and the likelihood of acceptance by the other group members can possibly be 
influenced (e.g., when the other group members monitor the peripheral representative's 
negotiation behaviour), peripheral representatives adopt a more competitive stance vis-à-vis 
the outgroup than when group membership is unattractive and/or the likelihood of acceptance 
cannot be influenced through negotiation behaviour. Although these findings are suggestive 
of strategic motives, it is important to note that we have no direct measures of such motives. 
Future research is needed to gain more insight into the role of strategic considerations as 
predictors of peripheral group members' behaviour in intergroup settings. 
Conclusion 
In their discussion of intergroup negotiation, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993, p. 153) state 
that "when groups and organizations face each other in negotiation, within-group dynamics 
can have important consequences for the between-group negotiation." Despite the obvious 
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importance of this claim, few studies have systematically investigated the impact of such 
within-group dynamics in an intergroup context. Extending the sparse extant research, the 
current work demonstrates that, under specific conditions, a representative's standing within 
the group may have a significant impact on his or her behaviour in intergroup negotiation. 
Specifically, we found that peripheral group representatives (as opposed to prototypical ones) 
behaved more competitively toward the outgroup when they were held accountable by their 
fellow group members and group membership was perceived as attractive. Organizations and 
nations in conflict may want to keep this in mind when selecting a group member to represent 
them in negotiations with the outgroup. 
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Footnote 
1 A pilot study showed that different distributions of prototypical and peripheral 
group members (i.e., a 3-1 vs. a 2-2 distribution) did not influence the effects of 
prototypicality. 
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Table 1 
Participants' Payoff Chart (Experiments 1 and 2) 
Amaro Campaign  Bailo Campaign  Cogo Campaign 
Level Reward P-group  Level Reward P-group  Level Reward P-group 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
120 
105 
90 
75 
60 
45 
30 
15 
0 
 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
240 
210 
180 
150 
120 
90 
60 
30 
0 
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Table 2 
Number of Cooperative and Competitive Messages Sent and Self-Rated Competitiveness as a 
Function of Ingroup Prototypicality and Process Accountability in Experiment 1 
 Prototypical Peripheral 
# Cooperative Messages 
       Accountable 
 
       Non-Accountable 
 
3.27b 
(1.68) 
2.68ab 
(1.74) 
 
2.21a 
(1.57) 
3.22b 
(1.74) 
# Competitive Messages 
       Accountable 
 
       Non-Accountable 
 
1.20a 
(1.49) 
1.86ab 
(1.43) 
 
2.46b 
(1.71) 
1.63a 
(1.55) 
Self-Rated Competitiveness 
       Accountable 
 
       Non-Accountable 
 
4.32b 
(1.53) 
4.96ab 
(1.18) 
 
5.34a 
(1.10) 
4.53b 
(1.68) 
Note. Means within a section not sharing a subscript differ at p < .05. Standard deviations are 
presented between brackets. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of the O/P Continuum (used in Experiments 1 and 2). 
Figure 2. Demand Level as a Function of Ingroup Prototypicality and Group Attractiveness 
in Experiment 2. Note. All participants in Experiment 2 were process accountable. Average 
demands are plotted in the graph. Standard deviations ranged from 75 to 84. 
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